...[P]hysics... [is] the philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws.

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how should the faculty of knowledge be called into activity, if not by objects which affect our senses and which, on the one hand, produce representations by themselves or on the other, rouse the activity of our understanding to compare, connect, or separate them and thus to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into knowledge of objects, which we call experience? With respect to time, therefore, no knowledge within us is antecedent to experience, but all knowledge begins with it.
But though all our knowledge begins with experience, is does not follow that it all arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we perceive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (incited by sense impressions) supplies from itself, a supplement which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.
It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investigation and cannot be disposed of at first sight: Whether there is any knowledge independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses? Such knowledge is called 'a priori' and is distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its source 'a posteriori', that is, in experience...

La sencillez y sobriedad de la naturaleza promueven y configuran en el hombre sólo nociones comunes y una tosca honestidad. La coacción artificial y la opulencia de la organización civil [de la sociedad] dan lugar a hombres ingeniosos y razonadores, si bien en ocasiones también a locos (Narren) y tramposos (Betrüger), y genera la sabia u honesta apariencia que permite carecer tanto de entendimiento como de honradez, siempre que el bello velo que el decoro extiende sobre las secretas dolencias (Gebrechen) de la cabeza o del corazón sea tupido y suficientemente tejido. — Immanuel Kant, Ensayo sobre las enfermedades de la cabeza